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DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS
In the law of contracts therd is a great deal of misunderstanding
or lack of understanding in regard to certain topics connected
with the subject of discharge. Some of this'is due to the fact
that few men use such terms as condition and warranty in the
same 'sense. The rest is due to faulty reasoning concerning mat-
ters that are admittedly difficult. This article will not attempt
to discuss the subject of discharge in all of its details, but will try
to delimit the.field and will discuss at some length a few of the
problems arising therein. In particular, the relations existing
between the subject of fulfilment of conditions and the subject of
discharge, and between breach of contract and discharge, will be
discussed. It is believed that great assistance will be obtained
from a clear understanding and a complete separation of primary
and secondary obligations.' Like aid will be gained from the
idea that the action of special assumpsit was an action for dam-
ages, was always the method of enforcing a secondary obligation,
while the actions of debt and indebitatus assumpsit were chiefly
for the enforcement of primary obligations.
PRIIARY AND SECONDARY OBLIGATIONS DISTINGUISHED.
The formation of a contract creates an original primary obliga-
tion. Upon the breach of this primary obligation, there arises
a secondary or remedial obligation to pay damages. Under some
circumstances the secondary obligation wholly replaces the pri-
mary one, which ,is regarded as extinguished. Under other cir-
cumstances both will exist together. The common-law remedies
1 See Holland, Jurisprudence, Ed. 10.
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are generally directed to the enforcement of the secondary obli-
gation, as in the case of the reme~ly in damages in express assump-
sit. The equitable remedy called specific performance is in-
tended to enforce the primary 'obligatio n; but the decree also
allows incidental damages, thus enforcing the primary and the
secondary obligations at the same time. The common-law reme-
dies in debt and indebitatus assumpsit are for the specific enforce-
ment of the primary obligation as in equity, also sometimes giving
incidental damages by way of interest.
Ordinarily neither law nor equity will afford a remedy for the
enforcement of the primary contractual obligation until a breach
of it has occurred. Indeed; not even the equitable remedy se-
cures the exact performance of the primary obligation; but it
approaches so nearly to exact performance that it seems proper
and convenient to say that the primary obligation is enforced.
But even though it is not enforcible until after breach, the primary
obligation is a tie that binds, a vinculum juris.
If A promises to complete certain work for B within a year for
$i,ooo to be paid'by B, A is under an obligation at once. This is
the primary contractual obligation. It is the only one that will
exist as against A, until a breach is committed by A. When such
a breach occurs, A will be under a new obligation to repair the
damage, to put B in as good a financial position as he would have
been in had A performed the contract. This is the secondary or
remedial obligation. It is the only obligation, in a case like this,
that can be enforced. Equity will not decree specific perform-
ance of a promise to perform labor, and the common law offers
damages alone. as a remedy. A is liable in special assumpsit
only; he is not liable in debt.
If, in the above case, B has paid the money, and A fails to do
any of the work, B can sue for a return of the money paid, as an
alternative of suing for damages. In a suit for damages, of
course, any money paid on account would be one of the elements
of the damage collectible at law. But all the other elements may
be waived, if B so desires, and he may sue merely for restitution
of the money he has paid. This remedy, is generally referred to
as quasi-contractual, but it is not truly so, unless all secondary
obligations are quasi-contractual. It is in fact secondary in char-
acter, arising out of a. breach of an antecedent primary obliga-
tion, and created by -the law independently of the consent of the
parties.
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The obligation of B to pay the $I,ooo i a primary obligation,
just as A's obligation to do the work was primary. No action
will lie-to enforce B's obligation to pay until after he has com-
:nitted a breach of it, until the time for payment has arrived.
After such a breach, B too comes under a secondary obligation to
-pay damages. In this case, however, B's original primary obli-
gation is of such a character that it can be specifically enforced.
The common law afforded such a remedy in the action of debt,
and therefore equity did not need to intervene. Strictly and
historically, the action of debt was for the sum due and was not
for damages. But the practical distinctions between debt and
assumpsit have been vanishing for more than three centuries, and
no doubt in debt the judgment will be for interest as damages in
addition to the sum due. Besides this specific enforcement of
B's primary obligation in the action of debt, his secondary obliga-
tion to pay damages is enforcible in special assumpsit, and the
amount of the debt due and unpaid is the largest element to be
included.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.
All those things that are necessary to the formation of a valid
-contract are conditions precedent to the existence of the primary
obligation. They are not conditions in the contract and are not
terms thereof, but are precedent to its existence. Any one
alleging a contract and asking a remedy thereon must bear the
burden of proving the fulfilment of these conditions. He must
prove the formation of a valid contract, the existence of a primary
-obligation. But he has still more to prove. He is asking a
remedy. He must show the existence of the secondary, remedial
obligation. This secondary obligation does not arise until breach
of the primary obligation by the defendant. The contract may
itself provide that certain facts must exist or events take place
-before the defendant's performance is due. Such provisions are
-conditions in the contract, terms of the contract. In addition,
the law itself, independently of the expressed will of the parties,
-may require that certain facts exist or events happen (such an
-event being often the substantial performance by the plaintiff of
his part of the contract). In such cases, the legal requirement
is based upon principles of justice, policy, and right, and not on
the expressed will -of the parties. All such facts and events,
-whether expressed in the contract or implied by the law, are con-v
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ditions Precedent to the existence of the secondary remediat
obligation. The party alleging a breach of contract and asking
a remedy must bear the burden of proving the fulfilment of these
conditions also.
DISCHARGE, IN GENERAL.
If the plaintiff has e stablished the fulfilment of the two fore-
going'sets of conditions precedent, has proved the contract ancF.
its breach, has shown the existence of a primary and a secondary-
obligation, the remedy follows as of course unless the defendant
can show a discharge. The question of discharge may arise with
reference to the primary contractual obligation, or with reference
to the secondary remedial obligation, or with reference to both at
once. It might seem that the continued existence of the primary-
obligation at the time of its breach would be a condition precedent
to the existence of a secondary obligation, and that the burden of
showing such continued existence is on the plaintiff; but the
Courts frequently assume the continuing existence of both obliga-
tions, throwing on the defendant the burden of proving a dis-
charge of either.
What constitutes a discharge and how should it be alleged? In
the first place let us consider certain things that do not constitute
a discharge. Lack of mutual consent (including mistake), lack
of consideration, lack of delivery in case of deeds, illegality, in-
capacity of parties, fraud, duress, all these affect' the formation of-
the contract, either preventing the existence of any primary obli-
gation; or making the contract voidable and the obligation imper--
fect, and- giving to the defendant alone the option of avoiding or-
of enforcing the obligation. A justifiable avoidance where the
defendant has'this option results in a final discharge of the 6bli-
gation.
The statute of frauds is a defense in some cases, but it never
effects a discharge. Certain statutes declare the contract void,
if not in writing. These prevent the formation of any primary-
obligation; they do not discharge anything. All other statutes
of frauds merely bar the remedy conditionally, without purport-
ing to discharge either the primary or the secondary obligation..
They operate after the fashion of a condition precedent.
The statute of limitations is like the statute of frauds in not-
effecting- a discharge. It bars the remedy, but the primary obli-
gation is still regarded as existing in an imperfect form, and may-
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still become the basis of an action in case of a waiver of the statu-
tory privilege It is not a discharge, although it acts somewhat
in the same way as a condition subsequent. Of course the-statute
may be so worded as to destroy all obligations whatever.3 In such
case it is a true discharge. After such a discharge, a new promise
without new consideration could be enforced only by a frank
adoption of the doctrine that a moral obligation is a sufficient con-
sideration. That the ordinary statute.of liinitations is not a dis-
charge is indicated by the fact that the creditor may still enforce
his liens and mortgages, if he has any, given to secure perform-
ance, even though there is no waiver by the debtor,- It seem,
that any method of enforcing the demand, other than action.at
law, is open to the creditor, The statute is only a rule of pro-
cedure and is not, operative outside of the statutory jurisdiction. r.
Bankruptcy laws very generally provide for an absolute dis-
charge upon the compliance with certain requirements Such a
discharge is applicable to either a primary or a secondary obliga-
tion. The burden of establishing it is of course on the de-
fendant.
BREACH OF CONTRACT AS A DISCHARGE,
It is frequently stated that breach of -contract by the plaintiff
operates as a discharge of the defendant." However, this seems
not to be logically correct, though in some cases it may be prac-
tically correct. The question can arise only in the case of bilateral
contracts, where a promise is given for a promise. If the de-
fendant's promise was offered, not for a return promise, but for
an act or performance, the defendant is not bound by any sort of
obligation until the plaintiff has acted or foreborne as requested.
Both thereafter and theretofore, it is impossible for the plaintiff
to commit a breach, because at no time has he made a promise and
at no time has he been under an obligation. The obligation of
the contract is wholly unilateral.
In bilateral contracts, sometimes the promises are held to be
"independent", meaning that the liability of each party for nor-
performance of his promise is not dependent upon whether or not
2IIsley v. Jewett, 3 Metc., 439; Way Z,. Sperry, 6 Cush., 23a; Dsen-
bury v. Hoyt, 53 N. Y., 521.
3 Pierce v. Seymour, 52 Wis., 272.
4 Wald's Pollock on Contracts,'Williston's Ed., 775.5Ibid., 777, 780.
0 Anson on Contracts, 3d Amer. Ed., by Huffcut, p. 356, et seq.
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the other party has performed his part. In modern times it is a
very exceptional case where the promises will be held to be en-
tirely independent. At an earlier stage the contrary was true.7
But if promises are independent, breach by one party-cannot dis-
charge, the other.
Supposing the promises are not independent, does a breach by
the plaintiff discharge the defendant? To say that the defend-
ant's promise is dependent means that he will not be liable in an
action until certain things promised by the plaintiff have been per-
formed. Performance of these things is a condition precedent
to the defendant's liability to suit. In cases of non-performance,
the defendant's liability does not accrue. The secondary or refiie-
dial obligation never arises, and hence it cannot be discharged.
In this matter, it makes no difference whether the condition pre-
cedent is expressed as such in the contract or is a pure constrttc-
tion of law (a "condition implied by law" so-called); and it
makes no difference whether the condition is the performance of
a thing promised or the happening of a thing not promised. If
it was not promised, of course its not happening is no breach of
contract on the plaintiff's part. But in all these cases alike, the
non-fulfilment of the condition prevents the secondary obligation
from arising. It does not discharge it.
But even though the secondary obligation is not discharged, for
the reason that it never existed, may it not be said that the non-
fulfilment of that which is a condition precedent to the existence
of the secondary obligation and to the remedy, operates as a dis-
charge of the primary contractual obligation? It is believed not.
Suppose the following bilateral contract: A promises to con-
vey land to B after B shall pay $i,ooo; and B promises to pay the
$i,ooo on March i, if A's title is then perfect. B could not sue
A during February, because of the non-fulfilment of a condition
precedent, although B has committed no breach. A is bound by
his primary contractual obligation, but his secondary obligation to
pay damages for breach has not accrued. If B should sue A in
April for not conveying, B not having paid the $I,OOO, the suit
will fail for the same reason as before. But in this latter case,
the facts show that B is -liable to stit; hie has broken his promise.
7 Nichols v. Raynbred, Hobart, 88; Pordage v.. Cole, 1 Wms. Saunders,
319. For modern cases see Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S., 188; Rugg v.
Moore, 110 Pa., 236; Beecher v. Conradt, 3 Kernan, 108.
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It does not follow from this that A is dischargedfrom his primary
-obligation. The only express condition precedent to A's liability
-to action was payment by B, not payment on March .i. Hence,
in case the law should not "imply" payment on March I as a con-
.dition, as it might well not do,8 B could pay later and still hold A
to his promise. In any case, B's breach would operate to give A
a right to sue him, but not to discharge A.
If we should suppose that payment on March I by B was a:
-condition precedent to A's liability, and that the money was not
paid, still A is not discharged. His primary obligation has merely
become voidable at his option (as in case of fraud, except that foi-
Teasons of policy the burden of proof is different). He may
waive the condition and hold B, in which case he remains bound
himself. Or he may refuse-to waive it and avoid the contract.
It is A's avoidance that discharges, and not merely B's breach.
But A may "stand pat", merely taking no action whatever, waiv-
ing nothing and avoiding nothing. In such case, B could -never
-maintain suit on A's promise and as a practical matter A may be
said to be discharged, although theoretically and logically he is
-not.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE.
There are various sorts of impossibility. It may exist prior to
the formation of the agreement, or it may arise subsequently. It
-may be legal impossibility or physical impossibility. The thing
that is impossible may be the performance of the defendant's obli-
gation itself, or the fulfilment of a condition precedent to the de-
fendant's liability, or the fulfilment of a condition subsequent;
the impossibility of any other thing is immaterial in determining
legal liability.
If the defendant makes a promise that is at that time legally or
physically impossible of fulfilment, no legal obligation arises.
Legal and physical possibility is a-condition precedent to the birth
-of the primary obligation. Of course mere difficulty is not im-
-possibility; but impossibility must be determined by practical
standards in the light of the present state of knowledge and in-
vention. If a man promises to dig a well yesterday, or to build
za house on the sun, or to make a road to China on a straight line,
no obligation is born. Such an impossibility is therefore not a
discharge.
8 See Constable v. Cloberie, (1626) Palmer,'397; Fr-eeth v. Burr, L. R.
9 C. P., 208; Mersey Steel & Iron Co. v. Naylor, (1884) 9 App. Cas., 434.
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In .case the impossibility arises. subsequently to the making of
the agreement, and by no fault of the defendant, it has been said
that the defendant is not excused.9  There are so many excep-
tions to this rule, that it is believed that the rule is itself incorrect.
In the cases laying down such a rule, thd performance of the de-
fendant's promise was not totally impossible, but had become
merely more difficult or more expensive to perform or,would re-
quire a longer time than agreed upon. Such greater difficulty
or expense is very generally held to be no discharge.' 0  But where
the performance of the, defendant's promise hasbecome legally
impossible," or physically impossible, it is believed to be correct
to say that the defendant has the option of regarding himself.a
under no liability. It is to be noted that it is bnly the primary
obligation that is impossible of performance. The, performance
of the secondary obligation, paymentof damages, never becomes
impossible. And the questjin is whether the impossibility of
performing the primary okligation prevents the accrual of any
secondary obligation. The correct rule seems to be that the con-
tinued possibility of performance for a reasonable period is a
condition precedent to the defendant's liability, even though the
parties have used no express words to that effect. Impossibility
does not discharge the primary obligation, although it prevents its
performance; nor does it discharge the secondary obligation to
pay damages,, but it prevents it from being born- unless the de-
fendant chooses to waive it. So, it has iany times been held
that where the continued existence of some specific thing is neces-
sary to the performance of the contract, the destruction of that
thing prevents any liability in damages.12  It has even been held
that the defendant is not liable where his failure to perform was
due to the existence of a contagious disease making- performance
dangerous to life, 13 or was due to a great and unexpected shortage
9 See Paradine v. Jane, (1648) Aleyn, 26, and cases following its dic-
tum.
'° Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn., 494; School Dist. v. Dauchy, 25 Conn.,
530; Derinott v. Jones, 2 Wall, 1; Ward v. Hudson R. Bldg. Co., 125 N. Y.,
230. The rule in Roman Law seems to have been the same. Dig. 45, 1,
de v. o. 137, Sec. 4-6.
11 Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B., 180; Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y.,
412.
12 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S., 826; Howell v. Coupland, L.R. 9 Q.
B., 462; Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass., 517.
"3Lakemen v. Pollard, 43 Me., 463.
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of water in a' stream by which logs were to be. transported."
These last cases must be regarded as contrary to the weight of
authority or as rare exceptions.
'If possibility of performance is a condition precedent to the de-
fendant's liability, the burden of proving such possibility is on the
-plaintiff. But the law will assume that performance is possible.
and the defendant must undertake the first step toward showing
'impossibility of performance unless the plaintiff's own allegations
show that the defendant's -promise is impossible to perform.
The impossibility instead of concerning the defendant's prom-
ise, hmay concern the fulfilment of a condition precedent to the de-
fendant's liability or a condition subsequent to his liability. The
-impossibility of anything that is of too little importance to
-be a condition of the existence of the defendant's liability cannot
affect that liability at all. If a condition precedent becomes im-
-possible of fulfilment, the defendant's secondary obligation never
arises, his liability never accrues. He is not discharged, for here,
:as in other cases, he may waive the condition if he likes, and per-
form his promise or pay damages for non-performance. Sup-
-pose a promise to pay $Ioo after X shall go to the moon. No
-primary obligation arises, for from the very beginning, the condi-
-tion is impossible of fulfilment. 15 But suppose a promise by A to
-pay $ioo after X shall paint A's house; the primary obligation of
A is formed; but if the house is burned before X paints it, A
-cannot be sued. But as shown above"8 this is logically no dis-
-charge.
It is stated in Wald's Pollock on ContractS1' that upon the hap-
Tpening of such impossibility "the contract becomes void, not
-merely voidable at the option of the party disabled",. citing the
14 Clarksville Land Co. v. Harriman, 68 N. H.,.374.
'5 -The suggestion in Worsley v. Wood, 6 T. R., 710, that "if there be
-a condition precedent to do an impossible thing, the obligation becomes
-single" cannot be accepted, if by "single" Lord Kenyon meant uncondi-
tional. The.Roman law and the codes derived therefrom agree with the
.text above. Gaius,.III Inst. 98; Code Civil Art 900; Audinet in Revue de
Droit International Priv6 for 1909, Nos. 3 and 4, 474; Erskine's Principles
-of the Law of Scotland, Ed. 20, p. 394; Kerr's Handbook of Mex. Law, p.
-46; Code of Mex., Arts. 1328-1354. The Sabinians and the Proculians
differed as to whether this rule applied to conditional bequests.
'a Pp. 517-519. _
'7 Williston's Ed., p. 545.
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case of Poussard v. Spiers.18  This is logically wrong, and the
case cited does not sustain it. An opera singer became ill and
was unable to attend rehearsals or to appear during the first week
of public performances. It was held that her appearance for
rehearsals and during the opening week was so important that it
was a condition precedent to the manager's liability on the con-
tract, and-that the manager was justified in getting a permanent
substitute. Here a constructive condition precedent became im-
possible of performance and was not performed. Of course, the7
manager's secondary obligation would not arise in the absence of
a waiver of the condition. But the contract did not become void-
It was not discharged. The manager had an option. He might
-still have required the singer to perform for the remaining weeks.
He was not discharged until he exercised his option. Neither
was the singer discharged, though no doubt the impossibility of
performing her promise would prevent her liability to pay dam-
ages from arising.
Conditions subsequent are defined below as discharging ar
already existing obligation. If such a condition becomes impos-
sible of fulfilment, of course the obligation to which it was subse-
quent is not discharged but remains enforcible.19
It appears, therefore, that in no case is impossibility a true dis-
charge of contract; but antecedent possibility is a condition pre-
cedent to the existence of a primary obligation, and continuing
subsequent possibility is a condition precedent to the existence of
a secondary obligation.
CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT.
An obligation, either primary or secondary, may be discharged
by the happening of a condition subsequent. A condition pre-
cedent has to do with the birth of an obligation, primary or
secondary. A condition subsequent has to do with an obliga-
tion's continued life after birth. When the condition subsequent
is fulfilled, the obligation dies. It might, therefore, be said that
any fact or event that kills a pre-existing obligation is a conditior
18 (1876) 1 Q. B. D., 410.
19 In Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Waill, 158, the fulfilment of the
condition subsequent did not become impossible; instead, it became legally
impossible not to fulfil it. The Court set it aside, on principles of justice,
so as to prevent the insurance company from being discharged and to pre-
vent the plaintiff from suffering a heavy forfeiture.
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subsequent. Such a broad usage of the term.is not customary.
It would make every form of discharge fall within the term.
Usage does not permit us to call a novation or a merger or an
alteration a condition subsequent. According to the best usage,
a condition subsequent in the law of contracts is a fact or event
which the contract provides shall discharge one from his obliga-
tion (either primary or secondary) after: it has accrued.
The word subsequent is a word expressing relation in time. It
means that one thing occurs after another has occurred. . In the
law of contracts, a condition subsequent may be a fact or event
occurring after the formation of a primary obligation, and putting
an end to it; or it may be one occurring after the accrual of a
secondary obligation, putting an end to that. An event putting
an end to the secondary obligation will generally end the primary
obligation also, though it does not have to do so. An event put-
ting an end to the primary obligation before the accrual of a
secondary obligation will prevent any secondary obligation from
arising.
The fact or event that constitutes the condition may be the non-
performance of a promise or it may be a thing concerning which
no promise has been made. Suppose a promise by A to convey
land to B after payment of $i,ooo by B, and a return promise by
B to pay $i,ooo on March I, it being further expressly provided
that A's obligation shall cease if the money is not paid on March
I. Here, non-payment by B on March i, is a breach of promise
by B, but it is also a discharge of A from his primary obligation.
It is an express condition subsequent to that primary obligation,
terminating its life. It is not subsequent to any secondary obli-
gation. Its fulfilment prevents such a secondary obligation on
A's part from arising. In this case it is not B's breach of promise
as such that discharges A. B's failure to perform discharges A's
primary obligation because the creators of that obligation ex-
pressly empowered it to live only until a certain event. The
obligation would have expired by this limitation and for the very
same reason, even if B had made no promise to pay on March i.
The ordinary option to purchase is a perfect example of this.
The holder of the option does not promise to buy, but the owner
is under a primary obligation until a certain date when it will be
discharged. In such case, it cannot be a discharge by breach-
The failure to buy is no breach, but it is a condition subsequent
and a discharge.
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BURDEN OF PROVING CONDITION SUBSEQUENT.
In a certain case, 20 a company issued an insurance policy, prom-
ising to pay a named sum in case of loss by fire. It was further
provided that any suit on the policy must be brought within one
year after the occurrence of the loss, the liability of the company
after such period to end and determine. Here, the failure to
bring suit within a year is an express condition subsequent. It
is subsequent to both the primary and the secondary obligations,
and upon its fulfilment they both die. In this case, the primary
obligation was born upon the execution of the policy. But the
insured's right to immediate payment did not accrue until after
the fire. Not until then did the defendant's secondary obliga-
tion exist. No doubt there were several conditions precedent to
the accrual of such secondary obligation, but the starting of a suit
was not one of them. In all cases, as stated heretofore, the
secondary obligation must exist before a right to sue can exist;
the suit cannot be itself a condition precedent to the right to sue.
The company's breach occurs before any suit is begun; its
secondary obligation to pay at once arose after the fire, but before
the bringing of a suit.
The burden of proving such a condition subsequent, just as in
case of any other discharge, is upon the defendant. The plaintiff
made out a cause of action when he alleged the execution of the
policy (the primary obligation) and the breach by the defendant,
which includes an allegation of the fulfilment of all conditions
precedent to the secondary obligation. The birth of such a
cause of action having been shown by the plaintiff, it is reason-
able to assume its continued existence and the law makes such
an assumption. The plaintiff must prove the birth of a right of
actigp; let the defendant prove its death. In the physical world,
if g body is set in motion it will continue at the same speed and
in tbl same direction, inevitably and forever, until some outside
pow affirmtively iptervenes. 5$p also if a body is at rest, it
will rgrnin at rest. Let him who alleges an affirmative inter-
ventfin prove it. The rule in the physical world may well be tlh
rple_ i. the legal world. It appeals to the normal sense of fair-
n~ess. Pragmatically speaking,'it is a rule that works, and gives
satisf.ction.
21 Semines v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall., 158.
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In another case 2l the defendant signed a promissory note for a
sum of money with a proviso that the note should be null and void
if a greater amount of oil should arrive in New Bedford prior to
October i than had arrived the preceding year. Here the Court
held that the defendant must bear the burden of proving that the
greater amount of oil arrived. This appears to be erroneous.
The Court called the condition a condition subsequent, and in fact
it was subsequent to the creation of the primary obligation, and
it provided for the subsequent death of such obligation. It may
properly be said that the law will assume the continued existence
of the primary obligation, and that the defendant must affirma-
tively prove any interruption. But even so, this would not au-
thorize a judgment for plaintiff on the note. He has no right of
action, however much we assume the continuance of the primary
obligation. He must also show that the secondary obligation has
been born. Until he shows this, the defendant may stand pat
and prove nothing. The plaintiff's right to immediate payment
of the note could not arise until the determination of the amount
of oil that arrived, and even then it would not arise unless the
smaller amount of oil had arrived. On October i either the oil
has arrived or it has not. The defendant is not liable to suit
prior to October i; and if the greater amount of oil has arrived
by that time, he is not liable afterwards either. But the plaintiff
must show that a liability t6 suit was born. For the law to re-
lieve the plaintiff of this burden, it must assume, without proof,
the birth of the secondary obligation and not merely its continued
existence after birth. This; of course, the law may do, but it is
believed to be inconsistent and illogical. Carried to its logical
conclusion, it would permit a plaintiff to rest his case after prov-
ing nothing but the formation of the contract, the birth of the
primary obligation.
In another case 22 an insurance company issued a policy in which
it was provided that the policy should be null and void if the
house insured should burn while unoccupied. The Court held
that the burden of proving the non-occupancy of the house was
on the defendant' company. This, too, seems erroneous. The
burning while unoccupied is indeed a condition subsequent to the
birth of the primary obligation; but the burning while occupied
21 Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass., 188.
22Moody v. Insurance Co., 52 Ohio St., 12.
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is a condition precedent to the existence of any secondary obliga-
tion, to any liability on the company, to any right of action.
Of course, the logical character of the condition does not neces-
sarily determine the burden of proof. It is perfectly proper to
throw the burden upon any one who alleges crime or fraud, or
upon the one having peculiar knowledge of the facts to be proved,
or upon one who has agreed to assume it. In the insurance case
above, the insured should have borne the burden of proof for the
additional reason that the fact as to occupancy was within his
own knowledge, while the insurance company might be unable to
secure evidence on the point. In the absence of some particular
reason to the contrary, the burden of proving the-fulfilment of a
condition precedent to the secondary obligation of the defendant
should be on the plaintiff, even though it be subsequent to the
primary obligation of the defendant. But the burden of proving
any discharge of such secondary obligation, and this a true condi-
tion subsequent is, should be on the defendant.
It seems that a condition subsequent differs from a condition
precedent also in this; it will never be implied by the law but
must always be expressed by the parties A condition implied
by the law is a pure construction of law, without reference to the
intention of the parties. Such a condition is constructed only
when necessary to do justice and maintain right against wrong.
To attain this object it is never necessary to "imply" a condition
subsequent or to discharge one from his obligation. It is always
sufficient for his protection to give him an option, to construct a
condition precedent to his liability, one that he may waive if he
desires. Such a condition prevents the birth of the secondary
obligation, but does not totally discharge.
The case of a surety bond may be thought to be an exception to
the foregoing rules, but logically it is not. It may well be that
here, just as in the oil case,23 and the insurance case 24 stated above,
the Courts throw the burden of proving the fulfilment of- the
condition on the defendant, calling it a'condition subsequent, when
logically it is not one. Such a holding may be justified in many
cases; in others perhaps it should be disapproved. The contract
may 9how that the parties intended the burden to be on the" de-
fendant. If so, it is immaterial what the logical character of the
23 Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass., 188.
24 Moody v. Insurance Co., 52 Ohio St., 12.
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condition is. In some cases, the condition may be a true condi-
tion subsequent. For example, suppose that A executes a bond
to B in such form as to make the amount a debt immediately pay-
able, but with a proviso that the liability should cease on the hap-
pening of a certain event. Here the primary and the secondary
obligations both exist at once, the condition is a true condition sub-
sequent, and the burden, of proving its fulfilment is on the de-
fendant. It is submitted, however, that the above is seldom in
accordance with the intention of the parties, to a surety bond.
Such bands are not intended to create a debt immediately payable,
but to create a debt.upon non-fulfilment of a condition. Thus,
a bond fora fixed amount givento secure performance of certain
duties by an officer is in reality a promise to pay the damages
caused by such officer's breach of duty, up to but not exceeding
the amount of the bond. Even though the. bond is in such form
that the action of debt would have lain' at common law for the
penal sum, without averring a non-performance -by the olfficer,
equity would not permit such a suit and ought-to require the
plaintiff to allege and prove the amount of his loss. The breach
of duty by the officer is in' reality a condition precedent to a right




A condition subsequent is a mode of discharge ;provided for in
the original contract itself. A discharge may also be effected by
a subsequent agreement. This subsequent agreement may take
the form of a release under seal, a mutual rescission, or a substi-
tuted contract. The sealed release is effective to discharge any
sort of a contract, and requires no consideration. The defendant
needs allege and prove only its execution and delivery. A mutual
rescission is effective only in the case of a bilateral contract that
has not been fully performed by either party. A consideration is
required for a release or a rescission not under seal. If either
party to a bilateral contract has fully performed his part, he has
nothing to gain by a rescission and the other party has nothing to
lose. A substituted agreement is a mutual rescission with the
addition that one or more new obligations are substituted for the
-2 See Wald's Pollock on Contracts, Williston's Ed., 356, 555.
26 The, remaining topics discussed in this article -are very fully .reated
by Professor Williston in his edition of Wald's Pollock on Contracts,
Chap. XIV.' The treatment of them here will be brief, with emphasis on
a few special points only.
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old. But the rescission and the substitution are interwoven into
one body and one breath, neither one having power of separate
existence. In pleading such a discharge, the defendant must
allege the very same things that must be alleged by a plaintiff who
sues upon a contract, except that hje does not have to show a
breach. The defendant is not seking a remedy and hence he
does not have to establish the existence of any secondary obliga-
tion. He must allege merely the agreement, showing that it in-
cludes a rescission of the former obligation. No technical lan-
guage is required. The facts must be so stated that the Court
can determine whether or not there was an agreement and what
were its terms. It need not be expressly stated that the first
obligation was discharged, and indeed such an allegation would
be unavailing if the proper interpretation of the facts shows that
a rescission was no part of the new agreement and that therefore
it was not "substituted". If the facts as stated are inconsistent
with the continued life of the former obligation, the plea is suf-
ficient. A novation is one form of such a substituted agreement.
Some problems arise in connection with the statute of frauds
and with contracts under seal, but they will be passed by in this
article. A covenant never to sue upon an obligation has been
given the effect of a discharge to prevent circuity of action.27
DISCHARGE BY PERFORMANCE.
The specific performance of an obligation discharges it, whether
the obligation is primary or secondary. A discharge may also
be effected by a substituted performance if it is accepted as such.
Such a substituted performance and the agreement inducing it
are called an accord and satisfaction. The accord is the, agree-
ment; the satisfaction results from the performance. The term
accord and satisfaction seems to be restricted in its use to those
cases where a right of action has accrued, and it is then applied
whether that right arose out of contract or in tort. It is applied
only as a mode of discharging a secondary obligation. Yet there
is no logical reason why the term should not be applicable to a
discharge of contract before breach, to a discharge of the primary
obligation. It is entirely competent for two parties to agree that
a certain substituted performance shall be given in discharge of a
contract, the time for the performance of which has not yet ar-
rived. In such case, there is no substituted contract. It is a
27 See Ford v. Beech, 11 Q. B, 852.
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substituted performance and until such performance is had, the
original obligation remains in force.
Of course, the parties may agree that their new contract shall
itself, prior to its performance, put an end to the previous obliga-
tion. This is called a substituted agreement, and has been dealt
with above. Such a new agreement may be substituted for a
previous primary obligation or a previous secondary obligation,
according as it is made before breach or after breach of the pre-
vious contract. If it is made after such breach, it is sometimes
called an accord; but it should not be so called. An accord is a
bilateral agreement for a substituted performance. If the new
executory agreement is itself substituted, after breach of the pre-
vious contract, it is a substituted agreement and an instant dis-
charge; it substitutes a new primary contractual obligation for
the previous secondary obligation.
"Accord" is the name for an agreement that is not substituted.
In itself, it discharges nothing. This fact led to the erroneous
idea that "upon an accord no remedy lies", that an accord is an
unenforcible agreement. Notwithstanding early dicta and de-
cisions, 28 there is no doubt that an accord is an enforcible contract
if it fulfils the ordinary requirements of other cortracts.
2 9 It
should be noted that an offer by the obligee tQ receive a substituted
performance, with no promise by the obligor to perform it, is no
accord, and of course upon it no remedy lies. The same is true
of an offered promise of a substituted performance by the obligor
with no promise by the obligee to accept it. These are not agree-
ments. but are mere offers.
It may be doubted whether an accord should not be held to
suspend temporarily the right of action on the prior obligation.
No Court with equitable jurisdiction would be embarrassed by the
old rule that the temporary suspension of a right of action de-
stroyed it forever.30  Even Courts of Common Law have not
been embarrassed by it in cases where the accord was a composi-
tion with creditors,"' or was a new negotiable note taken in con-
ditional payment.3 2  However this may be, the accord is no dis-
28 Lynn v. Bruce, 2 H. B!., 317; Allen v. Harris, 1 Ld. Raym., 122.
29 Nash v. Armstrong, 10 C. B. N. S., 259; Hunt v. Brown, 146 Mass.,
253.
30 See Ayloffe v. Scrimpshire, 2 Salk., 573.
31 Good v. Cheesman, 2 B. & Adol., 328; Newington v. Levy, L. R. 5
C. P., 607; 6 C. P., 180.
32 See Slater v. Jones, L. R. 8 Exch., 186.
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charge of the previous obligation. It is the performance of the
accord that results in satisfaction.
It was once supposed that the primary obligation of a contract
under seal could not be discharged by accord and satisfaction, but
that the secondary obligation to pay damages for breach of such
a contract could be so discharged.3 3  This distinction, based upon
the superstitious reverence for a seal, is long since dead.
ALTERATION, MERGER, ARBITRATION AND AWARD, SURRENDER AND
CANCELLATION.
The remaining forms of discharge will be given only passing
mention. A written obligation is discharged by a material altera-
tion made by the obligee for a fraudulent purpose. Alterations
by a stranger, accidental alterations, and 'immaterial alterationb
do not affect the obligation as the law is at present in the tUnited
States.
"Where an obligation arising under a contract is reduced to
judgment, or where an obligation arising under a simple contract
is put in the form of a specialty, the original obligation is by
operation of law extinguished and merged in the new obliga-
tion."3 4
An arbitration and award has much the same effect as a judg-
ment. The award is conclusive on the parties, and if the award
has changed the character of the defendant's duty, his original
obligation is discharged, and suit lies on the award alone. But if
the award purports merely to determine the amount of the con-
tractual obligation, suit lies in form upon such obligation, re-
covery being limited by the award.
The obligation of any formal document, such as sealed con-
tracts and negotiable instruments, can be discharged by voluntary
surrender or cancellation of the document. Such action is some-
what in the nature of an executed gift, the document itself being
the obligation. Where there is no instrument that can itself be
regarded as the obligation, there is great difficultr in proving the
-execution of a gift, for the obligation itself cannot be physically
delivered. But the surrender or cancellation of evidential docu-
ments may even in- these latter cases prevent proof of the obliga-
tion, or.may be given a'evidence of a mutual-rescission.
Arthur L. Corbin.
Yale Law School.
33 Blake's Case, 6 Coke, 43 b.
34 Williston, in his edition of Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 874.
